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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________________ 
 
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Defendant was convicted of two counts of bank robbery in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §2113(a).  He appeals on the grounds that 
as to the central issue, identification, the district court erred 
by (1) permitting in-court identification testimony by the two 
key witnesses, after they had observed defendant in shackles 
escorted by U.S. Marshals and then discussed his identity; (2) 
denying the defendant's motion for a line-up prior to the 
testimony of the two witnesses; and (3) ordering defendant to 
shave his moustache, put on glasses supplied by the government, 
and stand before the jury. 
 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§3231.  Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
 I. 
  
 Defendant Joseph Arthur Emanuele was convicted of robbing 
two Integra Banks, the "Millvale Bank" and the "Waterworks Bank".  
Martha Hottel, a teller, observed the man who robbed the Millvale 
Bank standing at a writing table before he came to her window and 
demanded money.  Five weeks later, when shown a six-photo array, 
she selected a photograph of the defendant but stated that she 
"wasn't one hundred percent sure" of her choice.  Appendix 
("App.") at 44.  When shown a second array several weeks later, 
Hottel selected the photograph of someone other than defendant. 
The bank's security cameras malfunctioned without photographing 
the robber, and latent fingerprints from the writing table and 
bank door did not match those of defendant. 
 The man who robbed the Waterworks Bank demanded money from 
Lorraine Woessner, a teller.  Woessner observed the man for 
several minutes at close range in the well-lit bank lobby.  Shown 
a six-photo array that included a photograph of defendant  
shortly after the crime, Woessner was unable to identify the 
robber.  App. at  44, 48.  The one fingerprint taken from the 
Waterworks Bank did not match that of defendant, but the 
Waterworks Bank security cameras did photograph the robber. 
 The two tellers were subpoenaed by the government to 
testify, and after checking in at the U.S. Attorney's Office, 
they were directed to sit outside the courtroom.  There, the 
tellers saw defendant led from the courtroom in manacles by U.S. 
Marshals.  Though later Woessner could not remember for certain 
  
who had spoken first, outside the courtroom the two tellers 
talked to each other about defendant, telling each other "it has 
to be him."  App. at 135. 
 Having learned of the encounter, defendant's attorney moved 
to suppress the tellers' anticipated in-court identification 
testimony as violative of defendant's right to due process, or in 
the alternative, for a court-ordered line-up.  The government 
conceded that it had been "careless," App. at 52, but argued that 
because the confrontation was inadvertent no constitutional 
violation had occurred. 
 The court denied the motion as to the testimony of Hottel, 
the teller who had identified defendant's photograph in one 
photospread but selected someone else in another.  App. at 73, 
82.  As to the testimony of Woessner, who had failed to identify 
defendant's photograph in the only array she was shown, the court 
held a hearing out of the presence of the jury and ruled that the 
second teller's identification testimony was admissible.  The 
court made no specific findings of fact.  Both tellers took the 
stand and identified defendant as the robber. 
 During trial, three government witnesses, who knew 
defendant, testified that he was the person in the Waterworks 
Bank surveillance photographs, and three defense witnesses, who 
also knew him, testified that defendant was not the person in the 
photographs.  An expert witness, a surgeon, testified that he had 
compared the dimensions of defendant's face with those of the 
  
face of the robber in the Waterworks Bank photographs and 
determined that defendant could not be the robber in the 
pictures.  Two government experts testified in rebuttal that the 
surgeon's calculations were unreliable. 
 Defendant also challenges the district court's order 
requiring him to shave his moustache and put on glasses similar 
to ones worn by the Waterworks robber.  At trial, the court had 
defendant wearing the glasses stand silently before the jury, 
which was instructed that "these are not glasses that were found 
anywhere.  They have been supplied by the government."  App. at 
338.  No witness was on the stand at the time. 
 After his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial based 
on the admission of the tellers' identification testimony and the 
orders to shave and wear glasses.  The court held another 
hearing, at which time two receptionists from the U.S. Attorney's 
Office testified that they had told the tellers to sit outside 
the courtroom, as is the government's custom, without any 
specific instruction from the prosecutor on the case.  The court 
denied the motion for a new trial.  App. at 680-83.  
 II. 
 As with many evidentiary rulings, we review a decision to 
admit identification testimony over an objection for abuse of 
discretion.  Government of Virgin Islands v. Riley, 973 F.2d 224, 
226 (3d Cir. 1992).  Where a motion to suppress has been denied, 
we review the order "for clear error as to the underlying facts, 
  
but exercise plenary review as to its legality in the light of 
the court's properly found facts."  United States v. Inigo, 925 
F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991).  If the admission of identification 
testimony violated the due process clause, as defendant contends, 
then we will consider whether this constitutional error was 
harmless.  Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 444 (1969). 
 A.  Admissibility of identification testimony 
 A government identification procedure violates due process 
when it is "unnecessarily suggestive" and creates a "substantial 
risk of misidentification."  Riley, 973 F.2d at 228.  See United 
States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1391-92 (3d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1988), aff'd, 493 
U.S. 342 (1990); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972). 
But see Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 258 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(standard is "'very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification'")(quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 
116 (1977) and Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 
(1968)), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1679 (1992).  A "suggestive and 
unnecessary identification procedure does not violate due process 
so long as the identification possesses sufficient aspects of 
reliability," for reliability is the "linchpin in determining the 
admissibility of identification testimony."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
at 106, 114.  See also Reese, 946 F.2d at 258 (suggestive 
interaction that creates no risk of misidentification does not 
violate due process). 
  
 To determine reliability, we examine the identification 
procedure in light of the "totality of the circumstances."  
Riley, 973 F.2d at 228.  These circumstances may include the 
witness' original opportunity to observe a defendant and the 
degree of attention during that observation; the accuracy of the 
initial description; the witness' degree of certainty when 
viewing a defendant or his image; and the length of time between 
the crime and the identification procedure.  Biggers, 409 U.S. at 
199-200; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114; Riley, 973 F.2d at 228; 
Reese, 946 F.2d at 258; Dowling, 855 F.2d at 117. 
 Several aspects of the reliability inquiry deserve comment.  
First, this court suggested in Reese that to determine 
reliability we may also consider other evidence of the 
defendant's guilt, Reese, 946 F.2d at 259, n.7, a principle we 
applied in Riley as well.  973 F.2d at 228.  The suggestion is 
contrary to the Supreme Court's guidance in Brathwaite that other 
evidence indicating a defendant's guilt "plays no part in our 
analysis" of reliability.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116.  Justice 
Stevens emphasized the point in his Brathwaite concurrence, 
applauding the majority opinion which "carefully avoids this 
pitfall and correctly relies only on appropriate indicia of the 
reliability of the identification itself."  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 
at 118 and note (Stevens, J., concurring).  We caution, 
therefore, that only factors relating to the reliability of the 
identification will be relevant to a due process analysis.  
  
Independent evidence of culpability will not cure a tainted 
identification procedure, nor will exculpatory information bar 
admission of reliable identification testimony.  We will consider 
other evidence only to determine whether an error, if present, 
was harmless.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 118, note (Stevens, J. 
concurring). 
 Second, we note that the standard enunciated for reliability 
in Riley differs from that applied in Reese.  Compare Riley, 973 
F.2d at 228 ("substantial risk of misidentification") with Reese, 
946 F.2d at 258, 262 ("very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification").  As in Riley, our phrasing of the standard 
in Stevens and Dowling omitted the requirement of irreparability.  
Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1391-92; Dowling, 855 F.2d at 117.  We 
conclude that our most recent statement of the standard, that of 
Riley, like our phrasings in Stevens and Dowling, most accurately 
reflects Supreme Court precedent.  Thus, we must decide whether 
there exists a "substantial risk of misidentification." 
 Third, previous courts, as the district court here, have 
wrestled with the degree of government complicity in a suggestive 
procedure that is necessary to implicate the due process clause.  
Where the alleged taint concerns the composition of a line-up or 
photospread, the government's involvement is clear; where the 
challenge concerns an encounter between witness and defendant on 
the street, in the courthouse, or at a prison, some courts have 
held that the government cannot be held responsible.  See, e.g., 
  
Reese, 946 F.2d at 261 (procedure proper where no evidence that 
courthouse encounters "were deliberately arranged by the 
government"); Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1390 n.11 (quoting Wilson v. 
Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 854, 857 (Ky. 1985)(defendant must "show 
that the government's agents arranged the confrontation or took 
some action during the confrontation which singled out the 
defendant")). 
 We hold that the government's intent may be one factor in 
determining the risk of misidentification, but it is not an 
essential element of defendant's burden of proof.  A series of 
events that is suggestive and creates a substantial risk of 
misidentification is no less a due process violation, even absent 
evil intent on the part of the government.  Stated differently, 
governmental intent is one of many factors in the totality of 
circumstances, but we expressly do not require defendant to 
establish the government's state of mind.  On the other hand, 
evidence that the government intended and arranged such an 
encounter would be a substantial factor in the court's analysis. 
 B. Application 
 At the suppression hearing the district court determined 
neither whether the courthouse encounter was unnecessarily 
suggestive nor whether there was a substantial risk of 
misidentification.  To the extent it considered the courthouse 
encounter, the court focussed on the government's intent.  See 
  
App. at 72, 87-88.1  Regarding the risk of misidentification, the 
court made no findings as to the Biggers factors and in fact 
instructed counsel that Woessner should "testify only on the 
issue of what happened yesterday."  App. at 90.  At the close of 
the hearing the court held: 
 Okay.  I'm going to allow Miss Woessner to testify and I'm 
going to deny the request for the lineup at this point, 
based on this witness' testimony that she has an independent 
basis of her identification of the defendant. 
App. at 138. 
 In essence, the district court relied on Woessner's 
testimony that notwithstanding the suggestive circumstances, she 
recognized the defendant.2  That testimony alone, even if 
believed by the trial court, would not be dispositive.  Indeed, 
if Woessner did not so testify, the issue would not even arise.  
All of these instances are predicated upon a witness' insistence 
that an identification can be made notwithstanding suggestive 
circumstances, and there is frequently a good faith belief by the 
                     
 
   1In its only writing on the topic, denying the motion for a 
new trial, the court concluded: 
 
 [A]n incident occurred which did not involve a deliberate 
attempt by the Government to obtain a suggestive 
identification by any witness . . . What occurred was an 
inadvertent and unplanned viewing . . . the Court finds that 
. . . this was not an identification procedure designed and 
manufactured by the Government to bolster the witnesses' 
testimony at trial . . . 
May 3, 1994 Order, App. at 683 (emphasis added). 
    
2The dissent quite properly refers us to this testimony. 
  
witness in such ability.  However, the sincerity or truthfulness 
of the witness must be considered along with the other Biggers 
factors in order to determine whether the risk of 
misidentification still exists, notwithstanding a witness' 
testimony to the contrary.  The trial court failed to consider 
the "totality of the circumstances," such as in this case the 
inability of the witness to recognize defendant in a photospread 
despite a sufficient opportunity to observe the robber at close 
range.  The court thus failed to apply the correct legal 
standard.  Because the factual record is complete and 
uncontroverted, however, we need not remand for further fact-
finding.  We will apply the appropriate standard to the 
undisputed facts. 
 We evaluate first whether the interaction was unnecessarily 
suggestive.  It is undisputed that the two tellers were sitting 
outside the courtroom because the U.S. Attorney's receptionists 
had told them to be there, and that defendant was walked past 
them in handcuffs with a U.S. Marshal on each shoulder.  
Defendant had not asked to leave the courtroom -- he was ordered 
out when the court granted the government's motion to have 
defendant shave. 
 In the face of these events, the government directs our 
attention to Reese, where we concluded that it was not 
impermissibly suggestive for a victim to glimpse defendant three 
times in and around a courthouse.  946 F.2d at 261-62.  Our 
  
analysis in Reese cited to and relied on United States v. Domina, 
784 F.2d 1361, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1038 (1987), a decision which held that it was not unduly 
suggestive for a victim to view a defendant leaving the courtroom 
during recess, because the defendant was not handcuffed, not 
escorted by marshals, and not otherwise singled out.  The 
circumstances here fit cleanly within the Domina exceptions cited 
in Reese, 946 F.2d at 261. 
 Nor are we persuaded by the government's invocation of two 
Eighth Circuit cases, United States v. Wade, 740 F.2d 625 (8th 
Cir. 1984), which we discussed in Reese, and United States v. 
Boykins, 966 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1992), because each involve 
facts different from those here.  Wade concerned a witness who, 
while looking into a courtroom from outside, was asked "in a 
nonleading fashion, shortly before she [took] the stand, whether 
she can identify a person."  Wade, 740 F.2d at 628.  The Eighth 
Circuit decided this was "the same question she will be asked 
while testifying" and was not impermissibly suggestive.  Ibid.  
In Boykins, a witness recognized a defendant while walking to the 
courtroom and informed the prosecutor, who then accompanied the 
witness down the courthouse hallway to confirm the 
identification.  Boykins, 966 F.2d at 1242.  In Boykins the 
government did not single out the defendant.  Furthermore, the 
failure of the witnesses in Wade and Boykins to identify a 
defendant in a previous photospread goes to the risk of 
  
misidentification, not the suggestiveness of the courthouse 
confrontation. 
 We conclude that the confrontation was caused by the 
government, albeit inadvertently, and that to walk a defendant -- 
in shackles and with a U.S. Marshal at each side -- before the 
key identification witnesses is impermissibly suggestive.   
 The more difficult question is whether this impermissibly 
suggestive confrontation created a "substantial likelihood of 
misidentification," in light of the totality of circumstances.  
Riley, 973 F.2d at 228.  First, though we will consider the 
reliability of each teller's testimony separately, we note 
several Biggers factors common to both: the two tellers (a) had 
several minutes to observe the robber, (b) at close range, (c) in 
a well-lit space.  We agree with the government that the 
unobstructed view of both tellers during the robberies would 
strengthen the reliability of their testimony.  But this point 
also supports defendant's position.  The tellers' protracted and 
clear view of the robber highlights Woessner's failure to select 
defendant's photo in the array and Hottel's choice of a different 
photo in the second array shown her. 
 Second, Woessner testified that she recognized defendant 
immediately upon seeing him in the hallway.  We will assume that 
her testimony was truthful and sincere. 
  Third, in the courthouse the two tellers observed defendant 
together and immediately spoke to each other about his identity, 
  
prior to their testifying.  This conversation may well have 
overwhelmed any doubts Hottel or Woessner retained after 
observing defendant in the hallway, though given the indication 
that Hottel spoke to Woessner first, it is the reliability of 
Woessner's identification that is more impugned.  Woessner 
testified:  
 Q Did Miss Hottel tell you that was him? 
 
 A Ah, not right away, only when he was down the hall she 
mentioned that.  I mean, she spoke very softly and said that 
she, she was very upset because she didn't remember -- she 
didn't think she remembered what he looked like, but when 
she saw him she knew exactly that's who it was. 
 
 . . .  
 
 Q  She didn't say that was him to you? 
 
 A I think we both looked at each other and we were kind 
of it's, it has to be him (witness nodding.) . . . 
App. at 134-35. 
 Finally, we consider a crucial difference between the 
circumstances of each teller's identification: the strength of 
the initial identification.  As we noted in Reese, whether 
subsequent viewings create a substantial risk of 
misidentification may depend on the strength and propriety of the 
initial identification.  946 F.2d at 262-63.  Upon viewing her 
first photospread, Hottel recognized defendant as the robber.  
Her slight qualification -- not being "one hundred percent sure" 
-- does not significantly diminish the import of that 
identification, nor does her subsequent selection of the 
  
photograph of another person in a second array.  In contrast, 
having scrutinized an array that included his photograph, 
Woessner failed to identify defendant as the robber.  All the 
photospreads were viewed close in time to the respective 
robberies. 
 Thus, we face a situation in which the one eye-witness who 
would be able to identify the Waterworks robber and place 
defendant at the scene of the crime, could not, despite her 
opportunity to observe, recognize him in a photo array.  That 
failure, coupled with the highly suggestive viewing of the 
defendant in conditions reeking of criminality, bolstered by the 
comments of another witness, render the in-court identification 
unreliable.  The reaction "it has to be him" greatly diminishes 
the reliability of Woessner's identification and renders manifest 
the impact of her viewing defendant.  In effect, the viewing 
communicated to the witness that the defendant was the robber, 
and there was no reliable evidence that she would have so 
concluded or testified absent that viewing. 
 Under such suspect circumstances, there clearly was a 
substantial risk of misidentification.3  It was thus an abuse of 
                     
 
    
3Even were we to require proof that the risk of 
misidentification by Woessner was irreparable, Reese, 946 F.2d at 
258, 262, our conclusion would be no different.  Had the district 
court granted defendant's request for a line-up, the risk could 
perhaps have been "repaired," but under the facts of this case, 
the denial of the motion for a line-up for Woessner was an abuse 
of discretion.  See United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412, 420-
21 (3d Cir. 1985) (line-up or similar procedure should "be 
employed whenever necessary to ensure the accuracy and 
  
discretion to admit Woessner's in-court identification testimony, 
in violation of defendant's right to due process.  As to Hottel, 
we conclude that her identification was reliable, and thus the 
admission of her testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 
 C.  Harmless error analysis 
 We must determine whether the admission of Woessner's 
identification testimony, which we have determined to be a 
constitutional error, was harmless.  Foster, 394 U.S. at 444.  We 
inquire whether the government has shown "beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained."  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(1967).  "To say that an error did not contribute to the verdict 
is . . . to find that error unimportant in relation to everything 
else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in 
the record."  Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991).  See also 
United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 898 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Because we recognize the risk that Woessner's testimony about the 
Waterworks robbery may have had a spill-over effect on the 
Millvale robbery verdict, we will consider its impact on both 
convictions. 
 1.  Waterworks conviction 
                                                                  
reliability of identifications"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1017 
(1988).  Woessner's observation of defendant from the stand has 
destroyed the curative capacity of a line-up, and to remand for a 
line-up at this juncture would neither assist the court in 
determining the reliability of Woessner's testimony nor vindicate 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
 
  
 Apart from the contested surveillance photographs, there is 
no physical evidence linking defendant to the Waterworks robbery.  
The government refers us to evidence that defendant had an 
expensive drug addiction and unexplained income, as well as his 
post-arrest comment to another inmate that he would "beat the 
case."  The government also relies on testimony of three persons, 
each of whom knew defendant, that he was the person in the 
Waterworks surveillance photographs.  Of the government's three 
witnesses, one testified he had seen defendant only two or three 
times; the second was an admitted drug user on probation for a 
prior drug conviction; and the third was a convicted drug 
offender with pending charges for drug and prostitution offenses.  
App. at 166, 180, 191-93. 
 In his defense, defendant's mother and two friends testified 
that he was not the person in the surveillance photographs.  App. 
at 344-45, 350, 362.  Defendant also introduced expert testimony 
from a surgeon who had compared the dimensions of defendant's 
face to those of the robber in the surveillance photographs and 
concluded that he was "100 percent certain that they are not the 
same two people."  App. at 407-08.  In rebuttal, two government 
experts testified that the calculations made by defendant's 
expert were unreliable. 
 Woessner's testimony was crucial evidence on the robber's 
identity, the only issue at trial, and we cannot conclude that 
her testimony was "unimportant in relation to everything else the 
  
jury considered" on the issue.  Yates, 500 U.S at 403.  A 
conviction should not be permitted to stand under such 
circumstances, and accordingly, we conclude that the error was 
not harmless. 
 Heeding the advice of Justice Black in his Foster dissent, 
we will clarify the proceedings to follow.  Foster, 394 U.S. at 
445 (Black, J. dissenting) (where appellate court vacates 
conviction for unconstitutional admission of identification 
testimony, court should specify which testimony by witness is 
barred at retrial).  First, because the hearings on defendant's 
motions to suppress and for a new trial elicited all the relevant 
facts and left nothing in dispute, another hearing on the 
reliability of Woessner's identification testimony is 
unnecessary.  Second, on remand for a new trial, the district 
court is directed to exclude in-court and out-of-court 
identification testimony by Woessner.  To admit evidence of 
Woessner's recognition of defendant in the courthouse hallway 
would violate the due process clause for the same reasons as did 
admission of the in-court identification testimony.  Third, 
subject to any other objections not herein considered, we do not 
limit the ability of the government or defendant to question 
Woessner on other aspects of the case, including the robbery 
itself, her initial description, and her failure to select 
defendant's photograph from the array. 
 2. Millvale conviction 
  
 As to the identity of the Millvale robber, Woessner's 
testimony was not directly relevant: she identified the 
Waterworks robber and said nothing about the Millvale robbery.  
The court recognizes, however, that there is a slight risk that 
Woessner's identification of defendant tended to buttress that of 
Hottel.  However, we are satisfied that such risk is minimal and 
the error harmless because of the other evidence supporting 
defendant's conviction for the Millvale robbery.  In addition to 
the same circumstantial evidence of defendant's drug addiction, 
unexplained income, and jailhouse statements, there was properly 
admitted in-court identification testimony by Hottel and evidence 
that she had recognized defendant in the first photo-array.  That 
identification testimony, as stated previously, was supported by 
her opportunity to observe the robber. 
  We conclude that Woessner's identification was unimportant 
in relation to all else the jury considered on the issue of the 
Millvale robber's identity, and hence the admission of Woessner's 
testimony was harmless error in that conviction. 
 III. 
 Over defendant's objection that it would violate due process 
and Fed.R.Evid. 403, the district court ordered the defendant to 
shave and to stand before the jury wearing a pair of glasses that 
resembled those worn by the robber and that were supplied by the 
government.  Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may 
  
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice . . . or misleading the jury." 
 In other cases, defendants have unsuccessfully invoked the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to challenge 
motions requiring them to shave or put on clothing.  See Holt v. 
United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910) (order to wear 
blouse); United States v. Valenzuela, 722 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (order to shave); United States v. Lamb, 575 F.2d 
1310, 1316 (10th Cir.) (order to shave), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
854 (1978).   
 Here, defendant raises a due process objection to the 
orders.  Some courtroom practices so deprive a defendant of his 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial that they implicate the due 
process clause.  See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 505-06 
(1976)(compelling defendant to appear in prison uniform 
unconstitutional).  Others, however, while seemingly prejudicial, 
may comport with the Sixth Amendment in particular circumstances.  
There is nothing inherently prejudicial in the orders requiring 
defendant to shave and wear glasses in this case, nor has 
defendant demonstrated that they so prejudiced him as to deny his 
constitutional right to a fair trial.  Indeed, the court informed 
the jury before defendant put on the glasses that they were 
supplied by the government and had not been discovered with 
defendant or any of his belongings. 
  
 Defendant also contends that the orders to shave and wear 
glasses violated Rule 403, in that the court failed to weigh 
their probative and prejudicial values.  "As a general rule, we 
exercise great restraint in reviewing a district court's ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 403."  Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Archibald, 987 F.2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 
1993).  However, where an objection raises Rule 403 and a court 
fails to record its balancing analysis, we may review the record 
and need not defer to the trial court.  Ibid. 
 Before deciding the motions, the district court held a 
hearing and determined: 
 The burden is simply to establish substantial similarity of 
circumstances, and I think the government has done that 
here, and I think it's clear the government has done that 
from my observations of the photographs, from the testimony 
of the [FBI] Agent, and from the offer of the defense 
witness.  And I think there's enough similarity and 
substantial particulars to grant the government's motion  
 . . . 
App. at 38.   
 Though the court did not record an analysis balancing the 
probative and prejudicial value of the proposed orders, we have 
reviewed the record and will affirm the orders.  The Waterworks 
surveillance photographs showed a robber wearing glasses, and 
photographs taken eight days after the robbery, when defendant 
was arrested, depicted him with a slight moustache, one the court 
described as not "comparable" to the one he had at the pre-trial 
hearing.  App. at 37.  There was also evidence that defendant had 
worn similar glasses before.  Thus, there was substantial 
  
probative value to having defendant shave and put on glasses.  
Defendant offered no evidence demonstrating prejudice regarding 
the order requiring him to shave, and the court informed the jury 
that the glasses were provided by the government and were not 
found with defendant.  We conclude that the probative value of 
the twin orders outweighed any prejudice and Rule 403 was not 
violated. 
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
conviction on the Millvale robbery count, vacate the judgment of 
conviction on the Waterworks robbery count, and remand for a new 
trial on the Waterworks count consistent with the foregoing 
decision. 
 __________________ 
 
United States v. Joseph Emanuele 
 
No. 94-3283 
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 
 I respectfully dissent from that portion of the 
majority's opinion which reverses the defendant's conviction on 
  
the Waterworks bank robbery count.  I do not agree with the 
majority's review of the evidence of Lorraine Woessner's 
encounter with the defendant in the courthouse hallway.  I am 
concerned that the majority in its citation of the facts focusses 
on facts which support its conclusion that the identification of 
the defendant by Lorraine Woessner was impermissibly suggestive, 
rather than looking at the whole picture.  Such a limited focus 
does support the majority's ultimate determination that the 
circumstances of the hallway viewing created a "substantial risk 
of misidentification."  However, I conclude that a broader review 
of Woessner's voir dire testimony is required and that review 
supports the conclusion arrived at by the district court. 
 My reading of the record convinces me that, when the 
evidence is viewed completely and in context, it will uphold the 
district judge's decision to permit Lorraine Woessner to identify 
Emanuele in the courtroom, without holding a prior line-up.  
Before permitting Woessner to testify or to identify the 
defendant, the district court had Woessner examined on voir dire 
concerning the hallway encounter.  I will set out Woessner's 
examination more completely so that its full scope can be 
appreciated.  I begin my discussion with relevant portions of her 
direct examination: 
 Q  At some time did you see someone come out of the 
courtroom? 
 
 A  Yes, we did, um hum. 
 
  
 Q  Could you describe to the Court exactly what 
happened? 
 
 A  Well, we were sitting there and we were, I guess we 
were waiting to be called in as the witness and three 
men came out, and we both were kind of startled, and I 
recognized him right away and, um, didn't say anything.  
And he was down the hall, and pretty far down the hall 
when we said to each other, it's him. 
 
 Q  So now, if I get this straight, when he first came 
out of the courtroom did anybody say anything to you 
prior to your having recognized him? 
 
 A  No. 
 
 Q  Now, why did you recognize him?  What was your basis 
for recognizing him? 
 
 A  I think it was like his eyes, only it was -- because 
-- it was his eyes. 
 
 Q  Now, at the time -- so, and what were you basing 
that, that rec-- that recognition on, on your 
recollection of what occurred on the December 1, 1993? 
 
 A  Well, because when it happened, he came in and 
stood, not behind my customer that I was waiting on, 
just about two feet onto the side of him and he just -- 
he had his glasses on and he just starred [sic] at me.  
I mean, it just like -- I, I mean, I'll never forget 
it. 
 
 Q  How long was he in front of you? 
 
 A  I would say -- I was finishing up with my customer.  
I would say like about three or four minutes. 
 
 Q  Now, the government has previously shown to you a 
series of pictures; correct? 
 
 A  Um hum. 
 
 Q  And if I could show you what's been marked as 
Government Exhibits 4 through 9 for purposes of trial, 
will you look at these for a moment? 
 
  
  Now, you've looked at those previously, right? 
 
 A  Um hum. 
 
 Q  And you weren't able to identify anybody? 
 
 A  Huh ah.4 
 
 Q  And you still can't? 
 
 A  I can identify him, but I mean -- 
 
 Q  You can't identify him from the picture?  
 
 A  Huh ah. 
 
 Q  But you can identify the person that you saw in the 
hallway? 
 
 A  Um hum. 
 
App. at 128-130 (emphasis added). 
 
 Further information was then developed on the defense's 
cross-examination of Lorraine Woessner on voir dire: 
 
 Q  And from the doors in the courtroom there's like a 
hallway leading to the hallway where you were sitting?  
In this hallway, there's a hallway that goes down? 
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  So, it -- like you were sitting like at the end of a 
"T" almost, so that you could see the courtroom doors? 
 
 A  We could see the courtroom doors. 
 
 Q  Okay.  And there's, I don't know, 20 feet or some -- 
approximately something like that from where you were 
sitting to the courtroom doors? 
 
 A  Yes. 
                     
    
4I interpret "um hum" as "yes" and "huh ah" as "no." 
  
 
 Q  And you and Miss Hottel were talking about what?  
 
 A  We were just talking about things that we were 
previously through.  We had gone through Integra 
training and we had gone through that. 
 
 Q  I see.  Now, the courtroom doors open and three men 
walk out? 
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  The gentleman in the middle has his arms behind his 
back? 
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  And he has one man on each side? 
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  Did the men on each side have like their hand on his 
arm or? 
 
 A  I didn't notice that. 
 
 Q  Didn't notice that? 
 
 A  Huh ah. 
 
 Q  You did notice, though, that the man in the middle 
had his hands behind his back? 
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  And you did notice at some time that he was 
handcuffed? 
 
 A  After he was down the hall. 
 
 Q  You could see when he was going down the hall that 
he was handcuffed? 
 
 A  Um hum. 
 
  
 Q  But you knew he was being escorted; he was in the 
middle from two guys that were escorting him out of the 
courtroom?  
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  Did Miss Hottel tell you that was him? 
 
 A  Ah, not right away, only when he was down the hall 
she mentioned that.  I mean, she spoke very softly and 
said that she, she was very upset because she didn't 
remember -- she didn't think  she remembered what he 
looked like, but when she saw him she knew exactly 
that's who it was. 
 
 Q  After the person was taken down the hallway? 
 
 A  Yes. 
 
 Q  You and Miss Hottel said that it was him.  You 
turned to each other? 
 
 A  No, not really. 
 
 Q  No? 
 
 A  Huh ah. 
 
 Q  Did you discuss the person that came out? 
 
 A  No, no. 
 
 Q  Didn't say that was him?  
 
 A  Huh ah. 
 
 Q  She didn't say that was him to you? 
 
 A  I think we both looked at each other and we were 
kind of it's, it has to be him (witness nodding.) 
 
 Q  But, it has to be him? 
 
 A  Um hum. 
 
 Q  Because he was handcuffed or? 
 
  
 A  Well, no, not because he was handcuffed, because 
from, from his personal appearance. 
 
 . . . 
 
 Q  After this happened. 
 
  Did you discuss with Miss Hottel the eyes? 
 
 A  No. 
 
 Q  She didn't tell you that? 
 
 A  Well, she, she thought it was his eyes, and I, I 
mean, I agreed with her. 
 
 Q  You agreed with her? 
 
 A  Right. 
 
 Q  But Miss Hottel did mention something about the 
eyes? 
 
 A  Um hum. 
 
 Q  Did she bring up the eyes first or did you? 
 
 A  I don't really remember that. 
 
 Q  The two of you, though, did have a conversation 
about the eyes on the person that was escorted out of 
the courtroom? 
 
 A  Well, we didn't have a conversation. 
 
 Q  You just said it was the eyes? 
 
 A  Right. 
 
App. at 133-136. 
 
 Based on this voir dire examination of Lorraine 
Woessner, the district judge decided that she would allow 
Woessner to testify and would deny the defense motion for a 
  
lineup because the judge found that Woessner had "an independent 
basis for her identification of the defendant."  App. at 138.  
From my review of this testimony, I do not find this factual 
determination by the district judge to be clearly erroneous.  See 
United States v. Inigo, 925 F.2d 641, 656 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(district court's refusal to suppress documents reviewed for 
clear error as to the underlying facts).  
 In reviewing such a factual determination by the 
district court, we do not have to agree with the conclusion 
arrived at by the district judge (although I am prepared to do 
so).  We must instead determine whether the district judge's 
conclusion is supported by the evidence.  See e.g. Cooper v. 
Tard, 855 F.2d 125, 126 (3d cir. 1988) (for clear error "our 
standard of review is whether there is sufficient evidence in the 
record to support [the district court's] findings).  Clearly here 
there is sufficient evidence.  Lorraine Woessner testified that 
she recognized the defendant "right away" as he came out of the 
courtroom -- before he passed her so that she could see the 
handcuffs and before Martha Hottel said anything about his 
identity.  The district judge was present to hear the testimony 
and to weigh credibility.  I find it inappropriate for us to 
completely disregard the judge's credibility determination -- as, 
it would seem, we must if we do not accept Lorraine Woessner's 
  
testimony that she recognized the defendant "right away" as he 
emerged from the courtroom.5 
 In view of the credence which the district judge had to 
give to Lorraine Woessner's statement that she recognized 
Emanuele "right away,"6 what weight must I give to the fact that, 
after Emanuele had walked past her, Woessner could see that his 
hands were cuffed behind him?  In view of the immediate 
recognition, I do not find Woessner's subsequent observation of 
the handcuffs to be unduly suggestive -- just as the majority 
does not find unduly suggestive the fact that Martha Hottel saw 
the handcuffs also. 
 This then brings me to the issue of the propriety of 
the standard followed by the district court:  Was there "an 
independent basis" for the identification; i.e., is Woessner's 
immediate recognition of Emanuele, a sufficient ground to support 
the denial of the defense's motion for a lineup.  I conclude that 
"an independent basis" for an identification is consistent with 
an identification which possesses sufficient aspects of 
reliability; that Woessner's testimony of immediate recognition 
of the defendant eliminates the "substantial risk of 
                     
    
5As the majority acknowledges, because there was no apparent 
government complicity in the way in which the confrontation came 
about, I do not have to factor the element of evil government 
intent into my consideration. 
    
6The district judge could not have arrived at the decision 
she did if she had not believed Woessner on this point.  
  
misidentification" which could be engendered by such an 
encounter.  If Woessner recognized Emanuele immediately in the 
corridor, I easily infer that she would have recognized him 
immediately in the courtroom had the corridor encounter not 
occurred.  Lorraine Woessner testified on voir dire that, at the 
bank, she observed the defendant for three or four minutes as he 
stood about two feet from the side of the customer she was 
waiting on; that she recognized the defendant immediately when he 
came out of the courtroom, before she could see his hands cuffed 
behind him; that she recognized him in the hallway from his eyes; 
and that the photograph of defendant, which she could not 
identify as the defendant when it was shown to her by the F.B.I., 
she again in the courtroom, after the hallway encounter, could 
not identify as the defendant. 
 For all the above reasons, I believe that the district 
court did not err when it permitted Lorraine Woessner to make a 
courtroom identification of the defendant.  I am, therefore, of 
the opinion that defendant's conviction on the Waterworks bank 
robbery count should be affirmed.7 
                     
    
7Because I would affirm the district court's admission of 
Woessner's in-court identification of the defendant, I do not 
need to go on to harmless error.  However, were that necessary, I 
would find any error to be harmless.  The surveillance photos, 
taken at the Waterworks bank, are independent corroboration of 
defendant's involvement.  They were identified, as being of 
defendant, by a disinterested witness, who had recently repaired 
Emanuele's car for him, and by a woman who had given him a 
temporary place to stay.  The "interest" of the witnesses, such 
as defendant's mother and his girl friend, who could not identify 
  
                                                                  
the bank photos, was made evident to the jurors, who also saw the 
photos.  
 Moreover, defendant's "expert witness," the plastic surgeon 
who testified from a comparison of photographs that the bank 
photos were not of Emanuele, admitted that he knew little about 
photography.  The photographs he compared with the bank photos 
were taken with a different camera and different film; the image 
was captured at a different location on the surface of the camera 
lens, while Emanuele was standing still.  App. at 444-46.  As the 
prosecution's photography expert testified, the slow film and 
poor lens in the bank camera could "smear" a moving figure on the 
film so that the image was distorted.  App. at 465-67.  In 
addition, the defense expert made his measurements from points, 
such as the eyebrows, which may move according to the subject's 
expression, e.g., a frown or a smile.  I raise my own eyebrows at 
this type of expertise. 
